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A B S T R A C T
The Central African Republic experienced unprecedented violence between
 and . We analyse three recent ruptures that developed as a result
of this crisis, suggesting a break with the country’s past. First, the Séléka rebel-
lion that started in ; second, the establishment of a robust UN
Peacekeeping mission in ; and ﬁnally, the democratic election of a civilian
president in . However, three deep-rooted patterns of governance have in
each case transformed these ruptures. A history of outsourced politics, a plural-
ity of violence and peripheral neglect push actors to perpetuate the violent past
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rather than breaking with it. We conclude that after an initial attempt to break
with the CAR’s long-term political economic trends, rebel groups, the UN
mission and the democratic government have backtracked and now risk reinfor-
cing the violence that mark politics and everyday life in the country.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In early , citizens of the Central African Republic (CAR) and
foreign observers hoped that the democratic election of a new president
and parliament would put an end to the major crisis that had swept
across the country from  to . Yet the current expansion of vio-
lence across the country and the growing presence of new and old
armed groups controlling large parts of the territory demonstrate that
the deployment of a UN peace-keeping mission and elections do not
necessarily bring stability. Rather, to the contrary, the CAR seems to
be slipping back into protracted insecurity with eruptions of violence
that characterised it prior to the beginning of the – crisis.
With both the acute crisis and the transition period over, there is rele-
vance in analysing the societal and political residues of the years from
 to . Three major ruptures with the past seem to stand out
as characteristics of this period. First, in , the Séléka became the
ﬁrst alliance of armed groups to emerge from the provinces to take
over power, instead of the more common coup attempts from within
Bangui’s political-military elite circle. Second, the deployment of the
UN peacekeeping operation MINUSCA since  marks the ﬁrst
robust mission that the CAR has known (MINUSCA ), despite
the many international and regional missions that have been deployed
in the country since . The most recent and third rupture with the
past is the fact that current President Faustin-Archange Touadéra is
the ﬁrst democratically and popularly elected head of state, never
having attempted to rise to power via undemocratic means. He initially
had also excluded previously armed actors from his government.
In this article, we confront and interrogate these recent ruptures – the
history of events (l’histoire événementielle) – with a longue and moyenne durée
perspective (Braudel : f). As Bayart has argued, African politics
today can only be understood when put in perspective of long-term tra-
ditions of governance (Bayart ). This longer-term perspective helps
us to understand and situate the political and social events that have
taken place in the time span of only a few years in their wider historical
context. At the same time, as Jan Vansina has pointed out with regards to
pre-colonial Central Africa, tradition has a Janus face and the exclusive
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focus on continuity risks under-appreciating change (Vansina : ).
Patrick Manning too stresses the importance of transformations rather
than continuities, and focuses on the ways in which African societies
have responded and reformed themselves in response to challenges
from within or from outside (Manning : ). As Clapham wrote
in his review on the longue durée in African politics, it is through a
balance between continuity and dynamism and transformation that we
can understand the present (Clapham : ).
Keeping this balance in mind, we look at the broader trends from the
colonial period to today, and outline the potential relevance of current
events and their broader impacts on the relationship between citizens
and their political authorities. On the one hand, we show how the
recent rebellion, external intervention and democratic elections were
signiﬁcant ruptures with the past. On the other hand, we demonstrate
that the impact of these ruptures has ultimately been subverted by the
continuities of the past (Spurk : ): the new ruptures have been
revoked. We deﬁne ruptures according to Christian Lund as ‘“open
moments” when opportunities and risks multiply’ (Lund : )
and study the extent to which the pervasive trends of the CAR’s political
economy may slowly shift as a result of these ‘open moments’ provoked
by the crisis. We therefore propose to situate the ruptures within the
country’s historical trends in order to observe their impact and rele-
vance for the present. We argue that the ruptures have led to a spike
in on-the-surface changes visible in violence, intervention and elections.
However, rather than altering the deep-rooted continuities of outsour-
cing, plural violence and peripheral neglect, the involved actors risk to
further entrench these dynamics.
The continuities we describe are not exclusive to the CAR, but import-
ant differences remain in states that seem similar at ﬁrst sight (Glawion
et al. ). In the wider region, political authority is shared, contested
and divided between a wide array of actors (Debos ; Mehler ).
In comparison to the CAR’s outsourcing by default (Lombard ),
governments in Chad and South Sudan share sovereignty more strategic-
ally with other armed actors as a means to reduce the burden of govern-
ing the hinterlands (Debos ; Raeymaekers ; Schomerus & de
Vries ). The comparatively weak state forces of the CAR have
been unable to provide even minimal stability compared with, for
instance, neighbouring Chad, where the president has successfully
managed to control the territory by using different militias for his
divide-and-rule strategy (Debos , ). In neighbouring
Cameroon, President Biya has maintained his regime over decades
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despite ongoing neglect of the rural hinterlands and insecurity at the
country’s fringes (International Crisis Group a, b; Mehler
). In the CAR, on the other hand, successive regimes have
remained incapable of holding on to power for more than a decade.
The CAR thus shares with some of its neighbours the challenges of
vast peripheral hinterlands and plural public authority, but where neigh-
bouring regimes have managed to use these characteristics to consoli-
date power, it produced a situation of protracted disorder in the CAR
(Mehler & de Vries ).
We base our analysis on historical and more recent literature on the
CAR and on an assessment of recent events via news sources, policy
briefs and reports. We undertook ﬁeld research in the CAR – in
Bangui, Bangassou, Obo and Paoua – in ,  and  during
visits lasting ﬁve, eight and two weeks. We studied the ways in which com-
munities maintained, organised or undermined local security, via inter-
views and focus group discussions with local institutions and state
agencies. We begin here with a brief discussion of the CAR’s long
history of exploitation and negligence from the colonial period
through to the crisis that started in . We then discuss the three
important ruptures that have occurred since the start of the Séléka rebel-
lion. We demonstrate for each how they have differed from what used to
characterise the country’s political economy. We conclude, however,
that despite the promising characteristics of these ‘open moments’ pro-
voked by rupture, the CAR and its citizens nonetheless continue to face
largely the same challenges that have characterised the lives of many
since the early s (see Table I).
T H E C A R ’ S H I S T O R Y O F O U T S O U R C I N G , V I O L E N C E A N D
P E R I P H E R A L N E G L E C T
The most recent crisis in the CAR started in September  when the
Séléka, an alliance of rebel groups that had operated in the north-east of
the country from  onward, set off to oust President François Bozizé.
They succeeded in March  and installed their leader, Michel
Djotodia, as president. The violence, looting and abuse they caused pro-
voked the mobilisation of a loose coalition of local defence groups, the
Anti-balaka. Violence between and among the Séléka and Anti-balaka
peaked in December . Due to his inability to bring stability to the
country and the failure to control his forces, international leaders pres-
sured President Djotodia to step down in January . A transitional
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government and parliament took over state duties for two years and were
replaced in early  after democratic elections. Despite the demo-
cratic resurgence, conﬂict between numerous armed groups continues,
and tensions within local communities remain unresolved. As a result,
the recent wave of violence has surpassed the protracted crisis that char-
acterised the decades prior to . Over the last ﬁve years more people
have been killed and displaced than in any other ﬁve-year period since
independence. The levels of armament have increased and armed
groups have multiplied, with recruitment rhetoric that deepens social
fault lines.
In order to examine the present situation and the ways in which it may
or may not deviate from the past, we here brieﬂy examine the country’s
history in relation to three connected trends that have characterised the
territory from pre-colonial times to this day: outsourced and extractive
governance; pluralised and violent power struggles; and a profound dis-
connect between the centre of power and its peripheries.
Outsourced and extractive governance marks the ﬁrst continuity in
the CAR’s political economic history. Governance was outsourced
even prior to the arrival of the French, via local sultans vying for
control over their hinterlands. Compared with other overseas territories,
the French colonial powers committed few resources to the expansion of
their authority in the region. The CAR never lay at the heart of France’s
colonial interest. Rather, the Oubangi-Chari territories, as it was initially
called, served as a region from which to extract resources. In order to
ensure a minimum of control over the territory, the French colonial
administrators sought ways to outsource security via protectorate treaties
with the main sultans of the late th century (Kalck : xxvi).
Another way in which France outsourced some of its political and eco-
nomic interests was via a system of what Rebecca Hardin coined
T A B L E I .
Longue durée, ruptures, and revocations in the CAR
Deep-seated pattern Ruptured by Revoked through
Peripheral neglect Séléka rebellion takes power
from the margins
Séléka lose power; rebellions fraction
further
Pluralised violence Creation of large UN peace-
keeping mission (MINUSCA)
MINUSCA becomes party to, rather
than arbiter of ﬁghting
Outsourced
governance
Democratic elections of a
civilian government and
parliament
Incorporation of armed leaders into
government; failure to take up
government duties
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‘concessionary politics’ (Hardin ; Smith ): it encouraged
private companies to seize control of the land so as to extract proﬁts
and taxes for the colonial authorities. What these concessionary com-
panies lacked in numbers and legitimacy they made up for in brutality
(Saulnier : ff; Woodfork : ). One result of the outsourced
brutality was the rise of popular resistance movements, such as the
Zande insurrection of  and the – Baya uprising
(Saulnier : ff; Kalck : xxviii).
The post-colonial regimes that came to power shortly after independ-
ence largely maintained this system of ‘concessionary politics’, under
which parts of the territory continued to be outsourced to private eco-
nomic and security actors (Hardin ). The very few foreign compan-
ies showing interest in investing in the country were granted access in
exchange for undisclosed entry fees. Bozizé, for instance, granted
Canadian UraMin, which was later taken over by the French parastatal
company Areva, the rights to exploit the uranium mines in Bakouma
sub-prefecture. A few years later, he opted to compromise his good rela-
tions with the Elysée in order to negotiate a new deal with a Chinese
company. Timber-logging companies and diamond-trading bureaus
were equally used as means to outsource exploitation in return for a
share of the proﬁts. Smith explains how some forest companies have sub-
stituted for government service delivery by building roads, schools and
clinics (Smith : f). Successive presidents have also outsourced
security to local defence groups in the hinterlands. This approach
formed the backbone of Bozizé’s security policy against road robbers
(Zaraguinas) in the north-west (Chauvin & Seignobos ). He out-
sourced combating the more serious rebellions in the north-east to
the French, who conducted air and ground attacks (International
Crisis Group : ff). Governance, whether in the ﬁeld of service
delivery, security or other public goods, was never a responsibility that
different governments attempted to live up to.
The second remarkable continuity throughout CAR’s history is the
important role played by multiple forms of violence. Violence has
taken the form of military coups, the everyday violence of state security
forces against citizens, and rebellions in various parts of the country
(Lombard & Batianga-Kinzi ; Lombard b). The ﬁrst abuse of
power in post-colonial CAR, although not via violent means, came
after the unexpected death of the country’s pre-independence hero
Barthélémy Boganda. David Dacko ascended to power by promising
the assembly deputies a ﬁve-year extension of their mandate in
exchange for electing him president (Saulnier : f). The
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presidents who followed Dacko either came to power via coups (Bokassa,
Kolingba, Bozizé) or ﬁrst attempted unconstitutional takeovers before
sealing power through elections (Patassé). While successive presidents
violently accessed and maintained their power at the central level,
local defence groups formed in response to the security gap that state
forces left in the peripheries. Armed groups also tried to beneﬁt from
the void through waves of rebellion, road robbery, incursions from
neighbouring states’ rebel groups, armed cattle herding and poaching.
In the absence of state control, these groups together created a very ﬂuid
security situation in which the multiple actors continuously struggled
against one another for access to economic beneﬁts and security provi-
sion for certain parts of the population. From the s onward this
mixture developed into the protracted insecurity and low-intensity
conﬂict that still marks the country today.
Third, part of the country’s persisting insecurity lies in the history of a
sharp disconnection between the centre and the periphery. This dis-
tance is not just spatial but also social: a small group of elites heads
the government in the capital and beneﬁts privately from the few
resources available to state institutions. At a great distance follow the
ordinary people, who have few opportunities. CAR’s most well-known
and notorious leader, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, centralised power not only
in the capital but also in his own hands – as symbolised by his auto-proc-
lamation as president for life in  and emperor in . Crucially, he
consolidated a tradition of conﬁning positions of power to a small group
of people who rotated into and out of these positions. His successors
have kept this tradition alive to the detriment of the periphery and
the periphery’s leaders, who remain disconnected from the power
centred in Bangui.
None of the presidents managed to meaningfully govern the sover-
eign territory, and the few incentives and possibilities for development
were used to beneﬁt only the small and rotating elite in Bangui. In the
absence of infrastructure, social services or the rule of law, the popula-
tion grew frustrated with the inertia of its leaders. People initially
greeted each takeover of power with enthusiasm before being deceived
again. While our present-day interviewees often ascribed a spike in state-
led development to Bokassa, it was in fact during this period that the
country’s rule of thumb ‘the country ends at Kilometre ’ was estab-
lished: development projects and state administration were and con-
tinue to be largely conﬁned to the -kilometre radius of the capital
Bangui (Saulnier : ).
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Rather than relating to state authority over the country’s peripheries,
keeping a hold on power has depended on external relations.
Throughout the ﬁve decades after the CAR’s independence in ,
the former coloniser remained highly inﬂuential through a continuous
military presence, high-level positions in the state administration, and a
dominant role in the economy (Baxter ). The presidents who tried
breaking this grip on power were all deposed with massive support from
outside. In September , French troops took control of the Bangui
airport, barred Bokassa from returning, and reinstalled former presi-
dent David Dacko to the presidency (Kalck : xxxvf). Patassé was
in power until France and the regional forces aligned to get rid of
him: France tacitly endorsed Bozizé’s return to the CAR (Mehler
: ), Chad’s president provided troops, and other neighbours pro-
vided funds and weapons (International Crisis Group : f).
France’s power over developments in the CAR only underlined each suc-
cessive government’s acute lack of capacity to control even the central
state. The CAR, as Roland Marchal succinctly summarises, is little
more than ‘the sum of its neighbours’ peripheral hinterlands’
(Marchal : ). It was in this context that, after over  years of exter-
nally managed and violent power rotations among a small, recurring
circle of elites, the Séléka rebellion managed to ascend to power. Its
arrival marked the ﬁrst of the three ruptures we discuss in the rest of
the paper.
T H E F I R S T R U P T U R E : T H E S É L É K A A N O M A L Y
The Séléka rebellion was the ﬁrst Central African rebel alliance that
tried to break the elite circle in the capital. As the ﬁrst Muslim president
of the country, Séléka leader Djotodia, together with his allies, formed a
broad coalition of outsiders. The Séléka became the ﬁrst group to try
and violently assert authority across the country. They brieﬂy but brutally
succeeded, except for the territory east of the Chinko river. However,
they got caught up in the CAR’s politics of limited central resources,
fragmentation and resistance.
The predominantly Muslim Séléka alliance emerged in  from a
few rebel groups that controlled parts of the local artisanal mining in
the north-east (Weyns et al. : ). These groups originated in
the Vakaga province and originally competed with one another over
the excavation and trade of the region’s resources. The area lies close
to the borders with Chad and Sudan, two countries that used to
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support each other’s rebellions, which in turn had spillover effects on
the CAR in terms of armed ﬁghters, the ﬂow of weapons, and cross-
border relations with rebel leaders in the neighbouring country.
Frustrations over the negligence of the central government, together
with the presence of important mineral resources, led to the establish-
ment of rebel groups beginning in . By  and , they had
signed several accords with President Bozizé in return for having their
grievances – lack of roads, healthcare, education and clean drinking
water – addressed (Spittaels & Hilgert : ). The government
never implemented its side of the deal and the rebellions festered
(Weyns et al. : ).
In , President Bozizé himself attempted to break with the past
tradition of outsourcing state governance in diamond areas – that is,
of allowing local and transnational groups to proﬁt from the diamond
trade in return for part of the shares – and attempted to establish gov-
ernmental control, albeit mainly for private purposes. During
Operation Closing Gate, government forces – unannounced and over-
night – conﬁscated diamonds, materials and even private goods from
eight of the country’s eleven diamond trading bureaus. These bureaus
were accused of not fulﬁlling government quotas. Loyal followers and
family members controlled the remaining bureaus and two newly
created ones (International Crisis Group c). Some rebel group
leaders cited the operation as one of their reasons for forming the
Séléka alliance a few years later (Weyns et al. ). Thus, rather than
extending the president’s – and through him the state’s – control, the
operation ultimately led to his downfall: the Séléka advanced into the
capital and took over power in March .
The change of leadership brought about by the Séléka’s takeover
signiﬁed a break with the power shifts that had taken place since inde-
pendence. With few exceptions, Séléka leaders had not previously
held ofﬁce in the CAR’s government or army. Not only did Séléka
leaders replace the ruling elite with people from the peripheral areas,
but they also maintained their own armed forces, which included mer-
cenaries from Chad and Sudan. Although the Séléka was often por-
trayed as a religious (Muslim) alliance, many armed groups from the
CAR joined it because of its increasing success in taking control of the
country’s territory. No former political or armed movement had
attempted to create such a broad alliance of political-military entrepre-
neurs to topple a sitting president. Previous coups had always been based
on a small circle of insiders with a small number of forces from the mili-
tary or a speciﬁc militia, and aimed at bringing one speciﬁc leader to
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power. The Séléka alliance, in contrast, harboured multiple rebel
leaders from the onset, such as Michel Djotodia, Nourredine Adam
and Moussa Dhaffane. Especially at the onset, the rebel alliance was
driven by foreign commanders and forces from Chad and Sudan,
whose governments tacitly endorsed them to challenge President
Bozizé, who had fallen out with Chad. Smaller groups and subcomman-
ders, such as Ali Darassa, also joined the alliance. Instead of forming part
of an integrated and coherent whole, each commander kept strong
control of the rank and ﬁle they brought along. Thus, while Djotodia
became the president, the other rebel leaders never expressed unques-
tionable loyalty towards him.
Unlike former rulers, who had concentrated on the capital, the collec-
tion of rebel groups managed to jointly control almost the entire terri-
tory. Where previous governments led by Patassé and Bozizé had
neglected the peripheries, Séléka generals attempted to consolidate
their authority over these areas in a decentralised, predatory manner.
Nevertheless, the central leadership did attempt to create some form
of cohesion in the rebellion-turned-government by replacing local com-
manders who had gone too far: in Paoua, for instance, the population
grew so frustrated with their foreign Séléka commander, who did not
even speak French or Sango, that a local civil mediation committee com-
plained to Bangui. In response to the complaints the Séléka leaders from
the capital came to inquire and replaced the local commander with a
less brutal one who spoke Sango (President of mediation board 
Int.). In Bangassou, a replacement Séléka contingent even engaged in
armed combat with the already present Séléka group to force them to
hand over power (Youth representative  Int.).
Nonetheless, the Séléka’s ruthlessness triggered widespread resistance
throughout the country. Respondents in Paoua and Bangassou
recounted how Séléka groups stole vehicles from churches, took NGO
infrastructure, broke into prefectural state coffers, dismantled buildings’
rooﬁng sheets and pillaged residential quarters (Priest Bangassou 
Int; Priest Paoua  Int.). They then moved their wares to Chad and
sold them at the markets (Trader  Int.). Ultimately, competition
over the spoils within extractive channels pulled the alliance apart.
Most obvious and lasting was the rift between Ali Darassa’s division, as
an alleged defender of the nomadic Fulani Mbororo, and other
Séléka groups that raided the Mbororo’s cattle for proﬁt. More devastat-
ingly, the violence and looting of the Séléka caused both a general
rupture in society – now often simplistically portrayed as a Muslim–
Christian divide – and the formation of countless resistance groups,
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jointly labelled the Anti-balaka. Anti-balaka groups reinforced the social
rift by expelling large parts of local Muslim communities from many
western and southern towns and the capital (Kilembe ) as part of
their resistance against the Séléka rebellion. These social rifts continue
to deepen to this day. In May , an Anti-balaka group organised a
concerted attack on Bangassou town, its MINUSCA base camp and the
Muslim quarter, killing over  people and forcing thousands to ﬂee,
including the region’s prefect (Prefect  Int.; Trader  Int.).
The Séléka leadership was thus unable to keep the alliance together
and hold onto power. The promise of spoils upon taking over control
of the government had motivated participants along the road to the
capital. Upon gaining power, however, the central state proved less of
a treasure than had been hoped. Large parts of the forces were primarily
interested in immediate ﬁnancial compensation, rather than the allevi-
ation of long-held grievances against the successive governments’ lack of
interest in the periphery. This dynamic was only reinforced by the fact
that many members of the alliance came from Chad and Sudan.
Djotodia dissolved the Séléka in September  because he was
unable to unite them under one Séléka banner. It was not enough to
hold on to power: he was forced to leave ofﬁce under great pressure
by neighbouring heads of states (Chad’s president Déby in particular)
at a summit of the Economic Community of Central African States in
Ndjamena in January .
The Séléka outsiders from the provinces had managed for a brief
moment in history to join the capital’s elite circle. Rebel-leader-
turned-president Djotodia and his minister of mining copied the extract-
ive strategies of previous regimes, such as putting most mines under
Séléka control and signing contracts with international ﬁrms for per-
sonal proﬁt (Southward et al. : ; Weyns et al. : ). After
Djotodia’s resignation, only three Séléka leaders were nominated into
Catherine Samba-Panza’s transitional government (Mehler ,
). These co-opted leaders faced a double disincentive to promote
governmental reform: they lost the legitimacy of their own rank and
ﬁle, and the terms of the transitional government barred them from
running for permanent ofﬁce at the end of the transition period. The
transitional government took inefﬁciency and abuse of ofﬁce for per-
sonal proﬁt to levels as high as former times (Marchal ).
The Séléka alliance marked an important rupture by bringing their
grievances from distant places in the country into the centre of power
in the capital. Additionally, upon taking power they attempted to
spread their territorial control throughout the majority of the country.
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The rather loose alliance of different armed groups proved an asset for
taking power but an important weakness in attempts to consolidate it.
(Ex-) Séléka leaders and groups continue to make headlines. Similar
to the situation prior to , they have split again into numerous
smaller factions, competing over spoils and trying to gain dominance
in different parts of the country’s territories. Thus, although as an alli-
ance the Séléka caused an initial rupture, the subsequent split into
even more and intricate rebel groups has reinforced the CAR’s long
history of plural authority. Their quick ascent to and departure from
central power also triggered the heaviest external interventions the
country has ever witnessed.
T H E S E C O N D R U P T U R E : T H E D E P L O Y M E N T O F A F U L L U N
P E A C E K E E P I N G M I S S I O N
The second aspect that marks an important break with the past  years
was the decision to deploy a full United Nations stabilisation mission
(Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation
en République Centrafricaine – MINUSCA). Before the mission was
deployed in September , two military missions had already inter-
vened in the crisis that had started in : the African Union Mission
Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique (MISCA), and the French inter-
vention Operation Sangaris. Since , the CAR has hosted various
regional and international peacekeeping missions under different man-
dates and ﬂags (Meyer ). These missions have been regionally
led – with heavy political, ﬁnancial and logistical involvement by the
French – and never were very strong. Most have focused on short-term
stabilisation, such as restoring order by halting rebellions and acute vio-
lence, or they have been involved in only speciﬁc tasks – for instance, sta-
bilising Patassé’s regime in the s or stemming the cross-border
violence in the north-east in the late s. Their mandates have
ranged from overseeing the electoral process, protecting the govern-
ment and reforming the FACA to restoring the judiciary system. In the
eyes of local people, the various missions have become indistinguishable
since they have followed one another in quick succession, often without
changing personnel or local command structures. In addition to the
various regional military missions, the country also hosted two United
Nations political affairs missions (BONUCA from  to  and
BINUCA between  and ), whose main tasks were to support
the government in consolidating peace and reconciliation (Bradshaw
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& Fandos-Rius : ). After  years of different political and mili-
tary missions, the arrival of MINUSCA marked a real change. For the
ﬁrst time the UN provided its political agenda of supporting the CAR
government with military means: a Chapter VII mandate, logistics and
the deployment of , troops (United Nations Security Council
; Welz ). While earlier missions had between  and 
troops, MINUSCA in theory could be the ﬁrst mission that outnumbers
the different rebel factions.
The mission has deployed in all  prefectures and is supposed to
support the government in disarming non-state armed actors and estab-
lishing a monopoly on the use of force (United Nations Security Council
: §). In the  years of CAR’s independence such state monopoly
has never existed, and despite MINUSCA’s efforts approximately % of
the country’s territory is under the control of various armed groups (La
Nouvelle Centrafrique ..). The mission only controls the urban
centres, while being unable to cover the outskirts and the rural hinter-
lands (Former rebel leader  Int.). Nonetheless, MINUSCA has
become engaged in ﬁghting against several groups throughout the
country. At times, it is ﬁghting both sides of a local conﬂict, such as in
Ouham-Pende, where it is in combat with both an ex-Séléka group
and Anti-balaka groups (MINUSCA Ofﬁcials  Int.). Paradoxically,
the more robustly MINUSCA has engaged in day-to-day security provi-
sion, the more it has had to adapt to local affairs. Locals have perceived
this robust intervention as having an immediate effect on increasing
security. However, such deep involvement has also meant that peace-
keepers have become caught up in local affairs in their areas of
deployment.
The key issue has been that foreign military interventions focus their
actions on consolidated armed groups, ﬁrst by ﬁghting them, then by
attempting to integrate them into disarmament programmes and
peace negotiations. In December , the French Sangaris mission,
for instance, focused mostly on disarming the more organised Séléka
and initially largely ignored the loosely connected Anti-balaka. It
thereby contributed to creating a heavy imbalance in the capital that
led to mass atrocities. Such events repeated themselves in the peripher-
ies – for instance, when the Sangaris troops entered Paoua in December
 and dislodged the Séléka. In the wake of the Séléka’s departure
from various regions, hundreds of thousands of Muslims were chased
from their homes as they were popularly perceived as Séléka supporters.
After these ﬁrst military measures, the more organised troops of the
(ex-) Séléka became MINUSCA’s main targets and interlocutors
R U P T U R E S R E V O K E D
regarding talks about disarmament, for instance. This came to the detri-
ment of keeping an eye on and responding to the more loosely orga-
nised auto-defence groups, including the different Anti-balaka
factions. In Ouham-Pendé, MINUSCA collaborated with one such
more-organised rebel group – the Révolution et Justice (RJ) – to combat
the region’s alleged ‘bandits’. However, some locals saw these bandits
as protective forces against the RJ, whom they feared. The alliance
became even more tenuous when the RJ made a volte-face and
decided to form a powerful alliance with its enemy, the Mouvement
Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC), a spinoff of the Séléka alliance. This
ran counter to MINUSCA’s own efforts to contain the MPC’s expansion
in the prefecture.
While MINUSCA’s dealings with ex-Séléka groups like MPC and Unité
pour la Centrafrique (UPC) were often marked by the use of force, local
inhabitants spread rumours of MINUSCA’s collaboration with the ex-
Séléka groups in the country. In Bangassou, in Mbomou prefecture,
for instance, people considered the Moroccan peacekeepers to be
allies of the predominantly Muslim ex-Séléka groups. Local frustrations
mounted to the point that auto-defence groups in Mbomou prefecture
attacked the Muslim quarter and the MINUSCA base in May 
(Sultan Bangassou  Int.). MINUSCA’s alleged one-sidedness thus
made them a party to, rather than an arbiter of ﬁghting.
The unpopularity and accusations of one-sidedness came in the year
after the mission was plagued by a different type of scandal that inter-
nationally was considered more detrimental to the mission’s legitimacy:
cases of individual peacekeepers’ sexual abuses. Numerous allegations,
against mostly Congolese, UN peacekeepers and French Sangaris
troops made international headlines. In response, the French author-
ities took up investigations – a court in December  concluded
that the allegations lacked evidence (Le Monde ) – and the
Congolese contingent was excluded from the mission in January .
To avoid future scandals, MINUSCA staff both at the headquarters
and in the ﬁeld decided to minimise interaction between peacekeeping
troops and the populace. Dealing with the population was left to the
civilian staff of the mission (MINUSCA Ofﬁcer Bangassou  Int.;
MINUSCA Ofﬁcer Obo  Int.). In Bangassou, a women’s organisa-
tion representative was critical of the Congolese peacekeepers’ behav-
iour (Vice president OFCA Bangassou  Int.). Nevertheless, she
and many other local interlocutors preferred the embedded presence
of the Congolese peacekeepers to the detached presence of the
Moroccan peacekeepers that replaced them.
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The relocation of MINUSCA’s base within Bangassou in  illu-
strated and corresponded to this detachment from society and everyday
security matters. While in  the Congolese peacekeepers were liter-
ally seated downtown in the old police station next to the market, the
new Moroccan peacekeepers plus the civilian staff were stationed at a
newly built base seven kilometres outside the town. From then on the
mission interacted with the populace and security actors only according
to ofﬁcial protocol and regulations. According to Michael Doyle and
Nicholas Sambanis peace can be built within the triangle of local
sources of hostility, local capacities for change and the degree of inter-
national commitment (Doyle & Sambanis : f). Considering
that despite the establishment of the UN mission, international commit-
ment towards stabilising the CAR has remained low, peacekeepers’
detachment further opens two sides of this triangle by ignoring local
capacities and tensions.
The cases of Paoua and Bangassou are an example of MINUSCA’s
acceptance of a plurality of competing actors intervening in the CAR’s
security realm. While initially peacekeepers and French forces inter-
vened decisively, their actions caused unintended side-effects such as dis-
placement. More recently, peacekeepers are retreating to their bases in
an attempt to detach peacekeepers from everyday security matters. This
has raised suspicions about their hidden aims and alleged support to ex-
Séléka factions as well as frustrations about the lack of protection against
attacks. Rather than provoking a rupture to the CAR’s longue durée of
pluralised violence, MINUSCA has allowed armed groups to proliferate.
Arguably more problematic, however, is that public opinion expressed
serious doubts over their role as an arbiter of violence when they do
intervene.
T H E T H I R D R U P T U R E : A D E M O C R A T I C G O V E R N M E N T W I T H O U T
F O R M E R C O M B A T A N T S
The elections that ended the transitional period in March  brought
forth the third and ﬁnal break with the past that marked the crisis years.
In the presidential elections, the former maths professor and primemin-
ister Faustin-Archange Touadéra defeated the internationally experi-
enced economist and former prime minister Anicet George Dologuélé
with a decisive % of the votes. The two rounds of elections were
mostly without violence, and no organised manipulations were reported
(Réseau Arc-en-ciel ; United Nations Security Council ). This
in itself was an achievement considering the country’s electoral history
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(Mehler ). Citizens contributed to a national grass-roots deliber-
ation process in most areas of the country in February , which
was followed by a forum in Bangui in May the same year bringing
together representatives from all regions. The last step in the round of
consultations was the approval of the new constitution via a national ref-
erendum in December . Elections for parliament and president
took place in multiple rounds between December  and May
, marking the ofﬁcial end of the two-year transitional period. All
members of the transitional institutions were barred from running for
ofﬁce in the elections. While this prevented them from skewing the
race in their favour, it also meant that members of the transitional gov-
ernment never engaged in reforming the system of governance. The
closure of the transition period through democratic elections gave a
semblance of putting authority back in the hands of the people and
their elected government.
Both presidential candidates in the second round had never
attempted to reach the highest ofﬁce by violent means nor had a past
relationship with armed groups. On taking ofﬁce, President Touadéra
initially put a stop to the trend of Central African elites merging political
and armed leadership: he barred anyone with ties to armed groups from
joining his cabinet. The move broke with the former regimes under pre-
sidents Djotodia, Samba-Panza, Bozizé and Patassé, which had tried to
co-opt the leaders of armed groups in order to stay in power.
In September , President Touadéramade a volte-face on his strict
refusal to include armed leaders and called a number of representatives
of ex-Séléka and Anti-balaka factions into his governmental cabinet, as
an attempt to co-opt them and decrease instability. Marchal ()
observed that despite their heavy conﬂicts, Séléka and Anti-balaka
groups converge in their opposition to the elite circles in the centre.
Both sides have repeatedly refused loyalty to leaders that positioned
themselves at the centre during Bozizé’s, Djotodia’s and especially
Samba-Panza’s rule. It is thus doubtful whether Touadera’s renewed
attempt will yield better results.
While similar in their anti-centre attitude and their lack of disciplined
hierarchies, the armed groups do differ widely as to their organisation
and aims. In general, ex-Séléka groups are better armed, disciplined
and more militarily structured than Anti-balaka groups, which seem to
have more loose command structures and often use artisanal arma-
ments. More crucially, some ex-Séléka groups are pursuing both territor-
ial control and a stake in the national arena: they want (some of) their
forces to be integrated into the national army through (what they
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believe to be lucrative) DDR schemes and positions in the national gov-
ernment. Anti-balaka groups – save for some self-proclaimed national
leaders – are more local in their outlook. The army is composed in
the largest part of old recruits from before and during Bozizé’s times,
and recently has received the ﬁrst  ex-Séléka forces to be integrated.
This calls the professionalism and neutrality of the army into question as
well as creating frustrations among those that are not yet or will not be
integrated into the army. Additionally, stakeholders in the capital mix
their political ofﬁces with their connection to armed groups. One MP,
for instance, explained that he could put , armed men on the
streets any time he wanted to and a traditional leader living in Bangui
took pride in his ambiguous links to auto-defence groups in his home
area (MP  Int.; Sultan Bangassou  Int.).
In a way, the countrywide grassroots consultations and the democratic
elections of a new parliament and president marked a rupture with the
trends of violent neglect of the peripheries and power-sharing agree-
ments to accommodate opponents. However, President Touadéra
revoked the rupture – of barring armed leaders from ofﬁce – after a
year as president and included multiple of them into his cabinet.
Contrary to previous regimes, the democratic leaders in the capital
show no signs of preying on the peripheries. Unfortunately, however,
the government again largely neglects the peripheries, as governments
have been doing since independence. The weak transitional government
under Samba-Panza as well as the new democratic leaders and represen-
tatives fail to even nominally control the rural areas and havewidened the
void between minimal government services and people’s expectations.
Today at least  different armed factions compete amongst each other
for control over the resource-rich parts of the territory. Other political
leaders mix the authority of ofﬁce with the threat of mobilising for vio-
lence. Today, the government is said to only control the major towns,
and only with the help of MINUSCA’s forces, leaving the rest of the terri-
tory to the control of different armed actors. Security andmost public ser-
vices remain outsourced to MINUSCA and international NGOs,
respectively. Peripheral neglect, pluralised violence and outsourced gov-
ernance have risen to levels above the pre-crisis era.
C O N C L U S I O N
After the presidential elections in February , the CAR had technic-
ally completed its transitional period and presumably entered the post-
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crisis phase. In this article, we have analysed three aspects of CAR’s
recent ‘histoire événementielle’ that at ﬁrst sight diverge decisively from
the country’s situation before the crisis. Looking at those three anomal-
ies through the perspective of the longue durée, however, offers an alter-
native reading. A high level of outsourcing of, initially, economic
exploitation, and more recently, public services and security manage-
ment has always characterised governance in the CAR. As a result of
decades of protracted insecurity, foreign companies have become ever
more reluctant to exploit the country’s resources through long-term
investments. Some exceptions can be found in the artisanal mining
and timber-logging sectors. A mixture of armed groups, foreign trade
networks and government ofﬁcials exploits the former while the latter
is organised through more ofﬁcial concessions. Basic services are out-
sourced to the ‘good intentions crowd’ – to borrow a term from
Louisa Lombard’s book on the CAR (Lombard a). MINUSCA dom-
inates the state’s security sector, but appears unable to protect civilians
when needed and is largely conﬁned to the towns. Outsourced govern-
ance in the CAR is today less a deliberate government strategy and more
an indication of the state’s relative weakness compared with the multi-
tude of other actors intervening in its territory.
The country’s history and present is, secondly, marked by pluralised
violence: a large array of actors maintains and disturbs the country’s
security. Despite MINUSCA’s presence in each of the  prefectures
and the mission’s support for the government, the majority of the
country is not under their control. The Séléka tried and failed to
rupture the legacy of ‘pluralised’ violence by seeking to dominate the
domain of violence by itself – a rather cynical alternative to the monop-
oly on the use of force. Yet, local resistance led to the formation of
diverse armed groups loosely allied under the Anti-balaka label, which
countered the Séléka’s attempts to violent control. Today, violence is
even more pluralised than before the – crisis: more rebel
groups have sprung up after the end of the crisis aiming at the control
of mining areas and roads or to violently proclaim the defence of exclu-
sive societal groups; While the central institutions have been reinstated
through elections, they form no reliable civil alternative for dealing with
tense politics; and MINUSCA is increasingly seen as partial to, rather
than an arbiter of ﬁghting.
Neglect of the peripheries is the third and ﬁnal historical characteris-
tic of the CAR that still endures. This partly stems from logistical difﬁcul-
ties linked to poor road networks, low population densities and the
subsequently high costs per capita to provide services and security. But
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the history of neglect has deeper roots. Prior to Séléka’s take-over of
power, the political risk of ignoring the periphery was minimal. The
current president is trying to reduce the impression of government
neglect through occasional visits to one of the prefectures, something
that interim president Samba-Panza rarely did. But such visits come
with little more than ceremony. The budgets allocated to the peripheries
are negligible, no nationwide policies are put forth, and administrators’
capacities to carry out potential plans remain limited. The UN mission
contributes to ‘the restoration of the state’ mainly by transporting gov-
ernment ofﬁcials to their affected posts, but does not provide the
means for them to engage in state administration. As a result, people
in the peripheries rely to a great extent on themselves, the respective
dominant local security actor, and the service priorities of international
NGOs for the provision of their daily needs.
The CAR’s deep-rooted functioning through outsourced governance,
pluralised violence and peripheral neglect have thus revoked the impact
of the three recent ruptures provoked by the country’s crisis between
 and . Nevertheless, our analysis of the lasting characteristics
of the CAR’s political economy shows that things are slowly changing,
for better or for worse: On the one hand, violence has increased and
become even more pluralised since the Séléka rebellion. On the other
hand, the UN intervention is making steps to bringing centre and per-
iphery together, and the government aspires to increase control
through collaborations with armed actors. The ruptures of the recent
past, however, have been revoked and risk further contributing to the
violent reordering of authority.
N O T E S
. For example the Bandia and Zande sultans and Sultan Senoussi in the north-east.
. We conducted ﬁeldwork from February to March  and from January to March  in
Bangui, Paoua, Bangassou and Obo. In August , we conducted two more weeks of ﬁeldwork
in Bangui.
. Michel Djotodia’s Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) and two breakaway
factions of the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP): Moussa Dhaffane’s Convention
Patriotique du Salut du Kodro (CPSK) and Noureddine Adam’s CPJP-fondamentale.
. Djotodia, however, had been a consul for the CAR government to Nyala, Darfur. The change
was much more drastic than the switch from southern leaders (les riverains) to northern leaders
(les savanniens) that had occurred with the election of Patassé in .
. The Ugandan and American forces in the African Union operation against the Lord’s
Resistance Army decided not to allow the Séléka to cross east of the Chinko river.
. Anti-Balaka is a very broad term ascribed to hundreds of local armed groups that put forth some
sort of local defence narrative.
. Apart from the rather short-lived UN mission in the border region between Chad and the CAR
in – (MINURCAT).
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. FOMUC failed to prevent Patassé’s overthrow in ; MICOPAX was unable to stop the
advance of the Séléka on Bangui in  or ; and MISCA could not prevent the violence
between ex-Séléka and Anti-balaka from spiralling out of control in Bangui in .
. Parliamentary elections took place at the same time, but multiple district results had to be
repeated or indeﬁnitely annulled due to irregularities.
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